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Douglas Laycockt
Writing a casebook is difficult. It is not enough to know the subject; the
author of a casebook must also think about pedagogy. Many casebooks
fail dramatically on the second count, and most have problems. Law
teachers are forever grumbling about the books available to them. Surpris-
ingly, and unfortunately, the third edition of Speidel, Summers, and
White's Teaching Materials on Commercial and Consumer Law" is an
uncommonly clear case of pedagogical neglect. Speidel, Summers, and
White are perhaps the most prominent casebook authors in the field; the
hornbook by White and Summers is the standard text.' Moreover, the
authors claim to have thought carefully about teaching, about how to in-
terest students, and about how to organize material to facilitate rather
than impede understanding.' For all of these reasons, the book seemed a
safe choice for my commercial law course when the book I had used be-
came outdated.
Instead, the choice was a disaster. There is no polite way to say what
must be said: The book is best used to show how not to write a casebook.
There is insufficient information about the law, the organization is awful,
many of the problems are unworkable or misleading, and much of the
remaining material makes no pedagogical sense.
These shortcomings were especially frustating to me because the book
reflects three pedagogical judgments that I endorse wholeheartedly: It em-
phasizes problems, it explains commercial background, and it attempts to
integrate practically related aspects of commercial law that are doctrinally
distinct. Properly used, problems are better than cases for teaching stu-
dents detailed analysis of complex commercial statutes. The most impor-
tant thing we teach in commercial law is how to work with statutes. Stu-
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dents will not memorize all the law, nor will they retain more than a
fraction of what they memorize. In any event, memorization would not
enable them to do much more than the clerk in the Secretary of State's
office. Law faculties must try to teach analytic skills and conceptual struc-
tures that will enable students to find and apply the law in novel situa-
tions. The relevant skills can be learned only by example and practice.
Problems provide the opportunity for that example and practice. Problems
are also essential for a less grand reason: There are too many important
statutory variations to illustrate by cases alone.
Commercial background is important because most students lack such
background, and without it, commerical law is a set of arbitrary rules to
be memorized. Integration of doctrinally distinct but practically related
material is essential to a coherent picture of the law. It is impossible to
teach about security agreements without reference to promissory notes or
the trustee in bankruptcy, or to teach about security interests in instru-
ments and documents without reference to the rights of holders.
Thus, my disappointment with the book is not that I prefer a more
traditional format. Rather, this critique is on the authors' own terms:
They failed to reasonably execute what they attempted. Commercial and
Consumer Law fails because it does not give students enough information
about the law, because it is badly organized, and because the problems
themselves are badly designed. I will illustrate the casebook's defects by
examining the chapters on secured transactions, a part of the book
designed to stand on its own in a separate course.
4
I. Lack of Information on the Law
The most common complaint of students in my course was that the
book has too little information about the law. This lack of information
results from the massive substitution of problems for cases without com-
pensating for the resulting loss of legal exposition.
Cases explain the law. A good case teaches the main points of a Code
section and illustrates it by specific application. The facts and the court's
analysis help anchor the Code sections in the students' memories. The
explanations in cases give students a basis for approaching related
problems. That is why casebooks frequently feature principal cases fol-
lowed by questions and problems. Problems can predominate if they are
well organized and designed. But the expository function served by cases
must still be served, whether by expanded text or even by partial explana-
tions within the problems. Students cannot be expected to solve problems
by consulting the statute alone. We may hope that they can do so by the
4. P. xxvi.
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end of the semester, but if they could at the beginning, they would not
need to take the course.
Commercial and Consumer Law does not have nearly enough exposi-
tion of the law. Speidel, Summers, and White largely omit the cases and
fail to add the necessary explanations. It is astonishing how few cases
there are on such basic article 9 concepts as attachment, perfection, and
priority. There are only thirty-three principal cases in the twelve chapters
on secured transactions. Of these, twenty-two are in the five chapters cov-
ering general intangibles, farm products, default, and bankruptcy.5 The
seven chapters on the rest of article 9 have only eleven cases, and half of
those are of little value. Two are on whether goods become fixtures,' an
issue the Code leaves to common law." One is an article 3 case.8 Two
cases are pre-Code common law.9 All of these have their uses, but none
serves the expository function of casebook cases: They tell students noth-
ing about the key Code sections. There remain only six other cases on
article 9 spread over seven chapters, and three of them can fairly be de-
scribed as esoteric.
10
In lieu of cases, the authors occasionally provide textual explanations of
statutory sections.11 But more often, they simply tell students to read the
Code, with nothing more than a list of Code sections and some problems
as a guide. Consider three examples.
The first is their treatment of priorities. The authors instruct students
to read sections 9-201, 9-301, 9-307, 9-308, 9-309, 9-312, 9-306, 9-313,
9-314, and 9-310.12 They then pose five priority problems. 3 Next there is
a four-paragraph note on "The Nature of Priority Rules."1 4 It offers a
few random pieces of information, adds section 9-103 to the list of Code
sections students should read, and concludes with the following questions:
5. Pp. 273-435 (chs. 10-14).
6. P. 161 (In re Park Corrugated Box Corp., 249 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.J. 1966); p. 165 (Corning
Bank v. Bank of Rector, 265 Ark. 68, 576 S.W.2d 949 (1979)).
7. See U.C.C. § 9-313(l)(a) (1977).
8. P. 129 (Factors & Note Buyers, Inc. v. Green Lane, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 43, 245 A.2d 223
(1968)).
9. P. 141 (M.M. Landy, Inc. v. Nicholas, 221 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1955)); p. 146 (Cooke v.
Haddon, 176 Eng. Rep. 103 (Nisi Prius 1862)).
10. P. 107 (In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1973) (lender who takes
security interest in lessor's interest in equipment lease must file on equipment as well as on chattel
paper)); p. 189 (Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Irving R. Boody Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560 (1963)
(Funk, Arb.) (security interest in goods, perfected before issuance of a nonnegotiable document of title,
has priority over security interest in document)); p. 227 (Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290
A.2d 648 (Del. 1972) (a prepaying buyer of inventory loses to secured party who repossesses before
delivery)).
11. See, e.g., pp. 103-04 (describing §§ 544, 547 of Bankruptcy Code); pp. 126-29 (describing
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To apply the priority rules intelligently, it is important to under-
stand the rationales behind them. These vary. For a start, see if you
can articulate the evident "core" and any "limiting" rationales be-
hind (1) the "first in time" priority of UCC 9-312(5); (2) the
"purchase money" exception to UCC 9-312(5) embodied in 9-
312(3); (3) the rule in 9-301(1)(b); and (4) the two rules in 9-307.
Make a list of the different types of considerations that appear to
figure in the formuations [sic] of these priority rules.15
These are not questions students can answer after reading the preceding
paragraphs and the cited Code sections. The final sentence of the note lists
three secondary sources that do discuss the nature of the considerations
that underlie the priority rules, but there is no discussion of what these
sources say. Few students will take seriously the notion that they are sup-
posed to examine all those Code sections, and the secondary sources, in
sufficient depth to answer the questions, especially when the casebook de-
votes only three pages to the topic.
The book's defenders might reply that this is merely an introduction to
priorities. It is true that most priority rules, and all major ones, are taken
up later in chapters on each kind of collateral. But these separate chapters
never consider priority systematically. An instructor who does not want to
teach priorities as isolated rules must teach the priority system with no
significant help from the casebook.
The second example is the book's treatment of the Tax Lien Act." The
authors paraphrase sections 6321, 6322, and 6323(a) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, which provide for a federal tax lien with priority that usually
dates from the time that the government files notice of the lien. 17 They do
not explain, or even cite, subsections 6323(c) and (d); the entire treatment
of these subsections is "a series of simple problems."' 8 Now as anyone
who has ever tried to teach these subsections knows, 6323(c) and (d) are
two of the most impenetrable statutory provisions in the English-speaking
world. No problem involving these sections is "simple" until one under-
stands them; only a tiny fraction of students could solve these problems on
their own. The futility of studying such materials before class leads stu-
dents to abandon all effort at serious preparation. It makes no difference
whether students are completely unprepared or have spent hours with
materials that teach them nothing. In either case, the classroom dialogue
cannot work.
The third example of inadequate explanation of the law is the authors'
15. Id.
16. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6323 (1976).
17. P. 249.
18. Id.
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treatment of the automatic stay in bankruptcy. After a single sentence ex-
plaining that the Bankruptcy Code bars "private" collection activities and
authorizes the trustee to use collateral, the authors instruct students to
"examine" sections 361, 362, 363, 364, and 365.19 The unannotated text
of these five sections covers more than nine pages in a typical statutory
supplement,20 much of which is irrelevant to the treatment of security in-
terests in bankruptcy. The authors make no effort to help students locate
the most important subsections. They do offer a case that is typical of
disputes now arising under the key subsections.21 The case is conceptually
helpful, but it is no aid in untangling the statutory text because it was
decided forty-three years before the statute was written. Once again, most
students give up on reading the statute before class, and the goal of class-
room dialogue is frustrated.
It is easy for instructors and authors to overlook the informational emp-
tiness of this book. For the teacher who already knows the law and is
comfortable with the statutes, a citation to a Code section conveys useful
information. When the class arrives unprepared, he may think students
are lazy or that they were confused by the book's organization. I thought
both of these things for a while. But gradually, and by force of repetition,
my students set me straight. They could not learn the law from this book,
they said, because there was so little law in it. They were right.
II. Disorganization
The organization of the secured transactions material is ambitious but
unfortunately unworkable. The unit begins with a two-chapter introduc-
tion, which includes a lengthy overview of article 9. Then follow seven
chapters ostensibly organized around specific types of collateral and
around the transactional patterns that typically accompany each type. Fi-
nally, there are three chapters on default, including one chapter on the
avoiding powers of the trustee in bankruptcy.
The attraction of this structure is that, if successful, it would give stu-
dents a good sense of how transactions under article 9 really work and
how the Code is applied in practice. The inherent disadvantages are of
two kinds. One risk is that the legal concepts around which the Code and
more traditional casebooks are organized will be unclear to students. By
the end of the semester, I had become convinced that this consideration is
decisive. Students must have a conceptual framework around which to or-
ganize the mass of detail in the Code. The relevant conceptual framework
19. P. 425.
20. See V. COUNTRYMAN, A. KAUFMAN & Z. WISEMAN, COMMERCIAL LAW: SELECTED STAT-
UTES 787-96 (1980).
21. P. 425 (In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935)).
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is the structure of the Code, because students must look to the Code to
retrieve the law they once studied. The best way to teach them the Code's
conceptual structure is to immerse them in it for a semester. A transac-
tional organization, even when carefully executed, tends to conceal that
structure by substituting a different organizational principle.
The second risk of transactional organization is that some material will
appear more than once and other important material will be omitted. In
Commercial and Consumer Law, the overview overlaps with subsequent
chapters, and the chapters on different types of collateral overlap each
other, because many of the same rules apply to more than one type. I am
not convinced that these organizational problems are insuperable. But
they require that authors consider very carefully what is to be covered in
each section and make those plans clear to both teachers and students.
These authors did not do so.
Quite apart from the problems inherent in a transactional approach,
the organization of the book within each chapter is incomprehensible. It is
impossible to describe in general terms just how badly these materials are
put together. Perhaps the best way to make the point is to recite the order
in which some material is considered.
Chapter four attempts an overview of secured transactions. This over-
view is not meant to be a mere introduction. It is intended to teach the
"fundamental problems common to the use of most types of personal
property as article 9 collateral."' 2  The book's preface states that it is in-
tended to be "slow going." '28 The overview provides the only opportunity
for systematic study of the structure of article 9. Its organization is
bizarre.
After a half-page introduction 4 and just over seven pages on the re-
spective roles of the lender's lawyer and the borrower's lawyer,25 there is
a two-page sketch of security devices existing prior to article 9.2" These
devices are simply listed without context; there is no hint that the bewil-
dering variety of pre-Code devices resulted from repeated innovative ef-
forts to escape the law of fraudulent conveyances and secret liens. This
story, crucial as background to article 9, is scattered over the rest of the
book. For example, an "Excursus" on Twyne's Case,27 secret liens, and
fraudulent conveyances comes some ninety pages later, at the end of a
22. P. 73. For example, with respect to sections 544 and 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 544, 547 (Supp. V 1981), the authors say in their overview, "We will discuss each of them intersti-
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chapter on equipment and fixtures,2" with no indication that it has any-
thing to do with the variety of pre-Code devices. A note on whether credi-
tors really rely on the debtor's possession of goods is found in the chapter
on pledges.29 An "Excursus" on a variety of modern situations in which
one party has possession of another's assets is contained in the chapter on
accounts and inventory. 30 These issues are inseparable from those of secret
liens, but there is no cross reference to the earlier material. Last, in the
chapter on farm products, there is a problem based on one of the modern
secret lien cases discussed sixty pages before.31 For once, there is a cross-
reference.
The overview's list of pre-Code devices is followed by a confusing and
almost unbelievable sequence of short sections. Read this paragraph
slowly, or it will make you dizzy. First there is a page and a half on "The
Concept and Structure of Article Nine."3 Next comes a two-page section
that treats the definition of security interest, the exclusions in section 9-
104, and the conflict-of-laws rules in 9-103.11 The next section, less than
a half-page long, introduces section 9-203 on attachment, but asks stu-
dents to solve a problem on future advances under 9-204.3t Next comes a
page and a half on perfection,35 a half page on default,3" and two pages
on priorities.3 Then the sequence starts over again, with a two-paragraph
section on the definition of security interest,38 five pages on attachment, 9
and six pages on perfection and filing.4" And this is not all.
41
The chapters designed to illustrate these principles at work in transac-
tions using particular forms of collateral are not much better. The chapter
on the pledge begins with two pages of history, using the pledge of Baby-
lonian slave girls as the primary example.42 Then a case discusses which














41. There are sections on the trustee's avoiding powers, pp. 103-06; the risk of misclassifying the
collateral, pp. 107-12; the drafting of security agreements, pp. 112-18; the promissory note and nego-
tiability, pp. 118-35; the effect of the security agreement on the note, pp. 135-37; "Other Relevant
Documents and Law," p. 137; and "Criteria for Judging a Sound System of Personal Property Secur-
ity Law," p. 138.
42. Pp. 139-40.
43. P. 141 (M.M. Landy, Inc. v. Nicholas, 221 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1955)).
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questions and problems on two issues: attempts to pledge intangibles,""
and pledges of tangibles when the pledgee's possession is ambiguous. 5
Next is the one-page note on whether creditors actually rely on the
debtor's apparent possession of goods.4" This issue is not unique to pledg-
es; it is equally relevant to any means of perfection.
The next section, two pages long, consists of an 1862 case of trover for
four cases of champagne drunk by a bailee,'47 followed by questions about
damaged collateral under the Code48 and a problem on the pledgee's lia-
bility for failure to convert convertible securities. 49 Next, there is a two-
paragraph note on repledging pledged securities,5" a problem on that is-
sue, 51 a problem on a pledgee of a note who negligently releases an en-
dorser's liability, 52 a page and a half contrasting the new and old article
8, 3 and a page and half on the history of stock certificates.54 The
teacher's manual that accompanies Commercial and Consumer Law sug-
gests that this whole disparate mess, from slave girls to stock certificates,
be taught in one day.
55
Consider one more example: the chapter on equipment, fixtures, and
other collateral in use. This chapter begins with a two-page introduc-
tion.5" The authors then reprint a sfandard security agreement.57 Nothing
in it is at all unique to equipment or fixtures, and there is no reason it
could not have been placed in the overview's section on drafting the secur-
ity agreement.58 Then follow three sets of problems, one set each on at-
tachment, perfection, and priority.59 Only one problem hinges on how the
collateral is classified, and that problem turns mainly on the definition of
consumer goods, which is the subject of a different chapter.60 These
problems also belong in the overview; they present no issues unique to
equipment or fixtures. The next two sections are indistinguishable; both
44. P. 143 (questions); p. 144 (problem 5-1 and part of problem 5-3).
45. P. 144 (problem 5-2 and part of problem 5-3).
46. Pp. 145-46; see supra p. 124.
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60. Pp. 158-59 (problem 6-2); pp. 358-93 (chapter discussing security interests in consumer
goods).
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explore the definition of fixtures."1 Nine pages are devoted to that subject,
followed by only three pages on priorities in fixtures.0 2 This material is
followed by two pages on future advances63 and the five-page "Excursus"
on fraudulent conveyances, 6 ' neither of which is any more relevant to
equipment and fixtures than to other kinds of collateral.
It would be more tedious than helpful to continue this page-by-page
review. Three chapters are enough to illustrate the principal problem:
The book is cut up into too many small sections, and adjacent sections
often have very little to do with each other. Instructors who are already
familiar with all the material and who have a firm organizational scheme
in hand can cope with the discontinuities. But these discontinuities pose
enormous problems for students encountering the material for the first
time and trying to form a conceptual structure as they go.
Not only are adjacent sections often unrelated, but closely related or
duplicative sections are often far apart. One gets the impression that each
chapter was written by one of the three authors, who included whatever
interested him without looking at any of his coauthors' work. There are
several egregious examples beyond those already noted. In the chapter on
accounts and inventory, there is an "Excursus" on the modification of pri-
orities by legal and equitable principles outside the Code. 5 The "Excur-
sus" consists of four hypothetical cases, none of which involves accounts or
inventory. There is no clue as to what non-Code principle is involved;
there are only citations to the actual cases that decided each hypothetical.
The "Excursus" is unrelated to what comes before and after it. But fifty
pages later, in the chapter on general intangibles, there are two cases in-
voking equitable subrogation to override article 9 priorities.6" As usual,
there is no cross-reference.
The accounts chapter and the general intangibles chapter both have sec-
tions on the rights of secured parties with interests in accounts disputed by
the account debtors.67 The overlapping sets of problems have no cross-
reference. The accounts chapter has a case on the rights of buyers who
pay cash before delivery;68 almost two hundred pages later, the bank-
ruptcy chapter has a problem on the same issue.69 The equipment chapter




64. Pp. 174-78; see supra p. 194.
65. Pp. 237-38.
66. P. 282 (National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir.
1969)); p. 287 (Alaska State Bank v. General Ins. Co., 579 P.2d 1362 (Alaska 1978)).
67. Pp. 217-22, 275-78.
68. P. 227 (Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972)).
69. Pp. 417-18 (problem 14-5).
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lien creditors and a secured party's future advances. 70 The second time
through, the authors ask students to identify "the reason for the newly
added UCC 9-301(4). ' 171 The reason is to give future advances maximum
protection from tax liens. No one could conceivably figure that out unless
familiar with the Tax Lien Act, but that act is not mentioned; it comes
three sections later.
7 2
This duplication and scattering cannot be defended on the grounds that
it integrates fact patterns or provides continuing review. That is neither
its purpose nor its effect. The lack of cross-references suggests that dupli-
cation results from inattention rather than from plan. The effects of this
disorganization are nearly all bad. Discontinuities conceal crucial relation-
ships and make it difficult to find specific material relevant to questions
and review.
III. Bad Problems
The problems are the key to the book. Given the lack of cases or expo-
sition of the law, it is essential that the problems guide students through
the Code. There are a few notable exceptions, 3 but most of the book's
problems are blighted by confusing names, unnecessary complexity, and
inattention to what is being illustrated. Problems should not test students'
ability to keep names straight; they should instead teach points of law and
provide practice in reading the Code. There is simply no excuse for mak-
ing a bank the debtor in a four-party fixture problem,74 or for referring to
the bank as Daisy and the department store as Marie Louise in a con-
sumer credit problem.75 Names of parties should be as easy to remember
as possible; these names are deliberately deceptive. Probably a majority of
problems have parties with such cumbersome names as Augereau, 8 Ber-
nadotte,7 Brabantio 78 Desaix,79 Kutuzov
30 Lucreta, 81 and Repeunzel. 82
This is not deliberately deceptive, but it is a nuisance. Class discussion
was regularly distracted by confusion over unfamiliar names that students
could neither remember nor pronounce.
70. Pp. 173, 237.
71. P. 237.
72. Pp. 248-51.
73. See infra p. 201.
74. P. 170.
75. Pp. 226-27.
76. See p. 173.
77. See p. 171.
78. See id.
79. See p. 100.
80. See p. 159.
81. See p. 144.
82. See id.
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Many of the problems are far too complex for teaching purposes. Sev-
eral appear to be old final examination questions, reprinted verbatim.8"
One even concludes with advice on taking exams: "Be sure to indicate
clearly the order of priority and support this conclusion with appropriate
citations to and discussion of the relevant Code provisions." '84
Printing exam questions as teaching problems reflects a profound mis-
understanding of the purpose of problems. An exam question should sam-
ple material from the whole course; most teaching problems, however,
should illustrate single new points. An exam question may conceal issues
and challenge students to spot them; a problem should isolate and high-
light new material for students. This is not spoon feeding. Digging the
answer out of the Code for the first time is challenge enough; students
should not have to search for the questions. An exam question can be long
and complex. There is a place for complex and difficult problems that
challenge students to integrate and apply what they have learned, but only
after a series of simpler problems has laid the groundwork. Most
problems should be short, and a series of problems should lead students
through the material by building up to more complex challenges. Speidel,
Summers, and White do not use complex problems that way. They substi-
tute old exams for basic teaching problems. That will never work.
Especially puzzling are the problems that do not illustrate what the
authors claim to illustrate. Students can only be confused when the text
tells them they are about to work perfection problems and the first three
problems have nothing to do with perfection,85 when a problem that is
supposed to be about foreclosing on chattel paper deals mainly with at-
tachment and perfection,88 or when a problem supposedly on preferences
in bankruptcy turns out to be about priorities between secured parties and
buyers of inventory.
87
Perhaps the most incredible example of a misleading problem is in the
overview. The authors say that problem 4-10 "is designed to introduce
sections 544 and 547."88 The problem has eight parts. Three parts turn
on sections 541, 548, and 551, sections that have neither been introduced
nor referred to at this point in the text. The other five parts demand far
greater knowledge of sections 544 and 547 than the book has provided. To
teach this problem would take at least a week. But such an effort makes
no sense, because there is a whole chapter devoted to bankruptcy three
hundred pages later. This problem is simply wasted.
83. See, e.g., pp. 247-48, 322-23, 416-18.
84. P. 248.
85. See pp. 259-60.
86. See pp. 322-23 (problem 12-4(2)).
87. See pp. 417-18 (problem 14-5).
88. P. 104.
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Other problems are blighted by the authors' failure to ensure that all
essential facts are stated and stated correctly. Thus, a problem on multis-
tate transactions says a security interest was perfected, but does not say
where.89 Another problem has the trustee asserting rights under section
553(a)(3), when the pertinent section is 544(a)(3). 90
Problems like these are inexcusable in any book. But they are especially
unforgivable in a book that makes problems the primary teaching tool.
IV. Ignoring the Basics, and Other Miscellaneous Examples of Peda-
gogical Neglect
The problems are not the only part of the book that is badly designed.
Many of the cases and much of the text are also confusing, misleading, or
badly chosen. The book suffers from a recurring tendency to emphasize
esoteric material without first-or ever-covering the basics.
Consider the overview of promissory notes and negotiability. 9 In ex-
plaining the requisites of negotiability, the authors state that the instru-
ment must have "words of negotiability. '9 2 They do not explain what
such words are. They illustrate the status of a holder in due course, not
with a readily understandable case involving failure of consideration, but
with a case involving a negotiable note, an oral side agreement that the
note is not to be negotiated, and a holder who takes the note after being
told of the oral agreement.9" The facts of this case are too odd, the parties'
behavior too unprofessional, and the legal issue too obscure to illustrate
the central principles of the rights of holders in due course. Yet it is the
only case on the topic in the overview. The authors offer a note on the
shelter principle, although this principle is rarely relevant to secured
transactions.9' In addition, more than half of this note is not about the
shelter principle at all but is a policy analysis of the holder-in-due-course
rule.95
After this garbled seventeen-page overview of negotiability, the authors
proceed as though they had really taught article 3. The next section offers
a difficult set of problems on the interaction of the security agreement and
the note.98 The first transactional chapter asks students to solve a vastly
over-complicated problem in which a promissory note is successively
89. P. 260 (problem 9-2(2)).
90. P. 171 (problem 6-9(1)).
91. Pp. 118-35.
92. P. 123 (citing W. HAWKLAND, COMMERICAL PAPER 19 (1959)).
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transferred among five different parties and a pledgee releases the liability
of an endorser.9 The overview of negotiability does not enable students to
handle such problems.
Chapter seven covers security interests in goods held by a bailee and the
interaction of article 9 with article 7." The focus of such a chapter should
be on the article 9 provisions governing interests in documents and goods
subject to documents, with just enough explanation of article 7 to make
the underlying transactions comprehensible. A more extensive treatment
of article 7 would distract from the focus on article 9 and, in any event,
should not precede full treatment of article 3 on negotiable instruments.
Once students understand article 3, they can easily learn about negotiable
documents by analogy with negotiable instruments. But this chapter turns
out to be the book's primary treatment of article 7,99 eleven hundred pages
before the primary treatment of article 3V100 The problems run students
through the article 7 rules on the duties of a warehouseman and on the
rights of holders of stolen documents and documents with forged endorse-
ments. This material is only tangentially related to article 9 security inter-
est law, and it is quite misplaced. The effect is not to integrate article 7
with article 9, but to drop an undigested chunk of one article into the
middle of the other.
The most extreme example of ignoring the basics occurs in an overview
section entitled "What is the Collateral? - a Pervasive Problem."10 1 The
section consists of In re Leasing Consultants, Inc.,10 2 a case holding that a
lender who takes a security interest in the lessor's interest in an equip-
ment lease must file on the equipment as well as the chattel paper. It is
bizarre to include this case without including any problems on the basic
distinctions among inventory, equipment, farm products, and consumer
goods; or among chattel paper, instruments, accounts, and general in-
tangibles. If that material were included, Leasing Consultants would
make a nice capstone case. With no buildup the instructor cannot teach it
"socratically"; he can only explain it.
Other examples of pedagogical neglect are scattered throughout the
book. These examples suggest a general inattention to detail. The authors
discuss construction financing in terms of assignors and assignees,103 de-
spite their own sound admonition to "avoid the use of names which are
97. P. 150 (problem 5-6).
98. Pp. 179-201.
99. There is also a chapter on documentary sales in the sales material. Pp. 898-939.
100. Pp. 1257-1471.
101. Pp. 107-12.
102. P. 107 (486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1973)).
103. Pp. 278-79, 287, 289-91.
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distinguished only by the final two letters."' 4 This particular usage is
especially indefensible, because the assignor and assignee here turn out to
be the debtor and the secured party. There is no reason to conceal this
from students by using non-Code terminology. The authors say that there
are three types of familiar transactions in which bills of lading are used to
secure credit; however, they mention only two, leaving students to wonder
about the third.10 5 They also ask what advantages field warehousing has
over ordinary inventory financing before they have introduced ordinary
inventory financing."' 6
There are also occasional lapses in the updating of materials. There is
an unexplained reference to "contract rights,"1 a term abolished in
thirty-four states 08 by enactment of the 1972 Official Text.'09 The au-
thors ask whether article 9 controls when the United States is the secured
party and refer students to a 1971 court of appeals opinion, 1 0 without
mentioning the recent Supreme Court case that substantially answers that
question."' The authors were not unaware of these developments. 1 2
Rather, they did not review their manuscript with sufficient care to iden-
tify passages requiring amendment.
V. Are There Any Good Points?
There are some good things about this book, although not nearly
enough to redeem it. The most obvious strength is the book's extensive
textual treatment of commercial background. I know one instructor who
assigns the book for the explanations of commercial background but as-
signs his own cases and problems. Some of the cases and problems do
serve their intended purposes. A few are notably good, or could be. If the
confusing names were eliminated, the problems on fixture priority"3
would be among the best at leading students through the mysteries of sec-
tion 9-313. There are nice problems on multiple purchase-money interests
in the same collateral," 4 and on delay by processing officials between
filing and indexing," 5 issues omitted from other casebooks I have used.
104. P. 116.
105. Pp. 199-201.
106. P. 185 (problem 7-1(2)). The chapter on accounts and inventory begins at p. 202.
107. P. 281.
108. 3 U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C., table of adopting jurisdictions).
109. U.C.C. § 9-106 reasons for 1972 changes.
110. P. 307 (citing United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971)).
111. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
112. See p. 240 (discussing the elimination of "contract rights" as a type of collateral); p. 249
(citing Kimbell Foods).
113. Pp 170-71.
114. P. 159 (problem 6-3(2)).
115. P. 171 (problem 6-8).
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The authors have a wonderful case illustrating section 544 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code."' The note on debtor's possession of other people's property
is very well done.
1 1 7
But these are isolated pearls, scattered through a disorganized informa-
tional desert. A few high points cannot make this book teachable. Perhaps
the bottom line was provided by my course evaluations: Two-thirds of my
students called the casebook "unproductive, often confusing."
Conclusion
An implicit pedagogical theory underlies this review. There is a limit to
how much time and effort students will devote to a course, whatever the
faculty might prefer. Casebooks and instructors should channel that effort
toward developing the most important skills and teaching the most impor-
tant subject matter. We should bring students to the edge of insight as
quickly and painlessly as possible. Then they should be asked to learn by
the "socratic" method, but not before. The law has plenty of real difficul-
ties for students to grapple with; it is never necessary to create artificial
ones.
If students are forced to scramble for basic information, or if they are
distracted by disorganization, misleading notes, and badly designed
problems, two bad things happen: Study will be less productive, and stu-
dents will study even less. We all avoid activities that are frustrating.
Throwing unnecessary difficulties in the students' way will not challenge
them to work harder; it will discourage them from working at all.
Commercial and Consumer Law plainly fails under this theory. But it
also fails on any other. The problem does not seem to be that Speidel,
Summers, and White wrote their book on a different pedagogical theory,
but rather that they gave little attention to implementing whatever theory
they may have had.
116. P. 395 (In re Plonta, 311 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1962)).
117. Pp. 254-57.
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